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CRIMINAL ENFORCEMENT OF FEDERAL
WATER POLLUTION LAWS IN AN ERA
OF DEREGULATION
The passage of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act of 1972
(FWPCA) I signalled the start of the federal commitment to the problem
of water pollution. Since then, the government has pursued the goal of
cleaner water through the creation of agencies, implementation of pollu-
tion control programs,-and prosecution of polluters. This approach has
led to some improvements in water quality, but nationwide water quali-
ty has not significantly improved. 2 With more Americans suffering from
-the effects of increased exposure to dangerous chemicals in our water-
ways, water pollution remains a serious problem.
3
The Reagan Administration has dramatically altered the federal
water pollution control effort. Pursuing economic recovery through de-
regulation, 4 the Reagan Administration in its first six months has taken
strong measures to reduce the burdens of pollution control regulations
1 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-376 (1976).
2 In its Eleventh Annual Report, the Council on Environmental Quality analyzed water
quality trends from 1970 to 1980, concluding that "water quality in rivers and streams...
seems to have changed little nationwide." COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, ENVI-
RONMENTAL QUALITY 1980: THE ELEVENTH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COUNCIL ON ENVI-
RONMENTAL QUALITY 108 (1981) [hereinafter cited as ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY]. The
report, which compiled data from the United States Geological Survey and from the Environ-
mental Protection Agency, cited several locations where water quality had improved. Id
However, the report noted that there had been no decrease in the level of traditional pollu-
tion indicators-fecal coliform bacteria, total phosphorus, lead and mercury. Additionally,
the manufacture of new toxic chemical compounds was deemed likely to lead to further water
quality deterioration. Id at 190.
3 Both old and new sources of water pollution have caused health problems. The CEQ
report discussed the effects of low levels of exposure to dangerous chemicals, outlining the
incidence of sterility, poisoning, and skin discomforts. The report states, "Cancer is the only
major cause of death whose incidence has continued to rise since 1900. Smoking is undoubt-
edly part of the cause, but there is evidence that other facts, perhaps including increased
public exposure to synthetic organic chemicals, may also be contributing." Id
Moreover, some scientists claim that the average American's contact with toxic indus-
trial chemicals and other water pollutants will double within the next ten years. WASH.
MONTHLY, Dec. 1981, at 30.
4 President Reagan regards excessive regulation of industry as a major cause of the falter-
ing economy. Shortly after taking office, he said, "Government regulations impose an enor-
mous burden on large and small business in America, discourage productivity, and contribute
substantially to our current economic woes . . . . It is my intention to curb the size and
influence of the federal establishment." Bus. WK., Mar. 9, 1981, at 62.
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on the economy. With decreased environmental regulation, it is unclear
whether the new federal effort can prevent significant deterioration of
the nation's waters.
This Comment will discuss recent legal and political developments
concerning water pollution control. It will analyze, in light of the di-
minished federal effort, how the courts' treatment of different issues will
affect the pollution abatement effort. Additionally, its aim is to suggest
how an intelligent enforcement approach may prevent the degradation
of our waterways.
I. THE DECREASING FEDERAL EFFORT TO
ABATE WATER POLLUTION
A. EXECUTIVE ORDERS
The Reagan Administration in its first six months acted to diminish
the federal government's role in the abatement of water pollution. The
President's actions will reduce resources available to the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA), which oversees most pollution abatement
programs. Shortly after taking office, President Reagan postponed the
implementation of the "Midnight Regulations" promulgated by execu-
tive agencies during the last days of former President Carter's term but
which had not yet become effective. 5 Additionally, agencies were or-
dered not to issue new regulations for at least sixty days.6 President
Reagan also announced the formation of a Task Force on Regulatory
Relief to review the efficiency of the "Midnight Regulations."' 7 The
Task Force has already postponed two major water pollution
regulations.8
President Reagan then issued an Executive Order designed "to re-
duce the burdens of existing and future regulations, [and to] increase
agency accountability for regulatory actions. . . ."9 This order gave
the increasingly important Office of Management and Budget (OMB)
the power to review and order revisions of regulations thought to be
particularly burdensome. OMB has already singled out for extensive
review more than forty major EPA regulations. Nine regulations, sev-
5 President Reagan's Memorandum to Agencies Ordering Postponement of Pending
Regulations (Jan. 29, 1981), citedin [1981] 11 ENv'T. REP. (BNA) 1939.
6 White House Fact Sheet on Memorandum Ordering Agencies to Postpone Pending
Regulations (Jan. 29, 1981), cited in [1981] 11 ENv'T. REP. (BNA) 1940.
7 [1981] 11 ENV'T REP. (BNA) 1853.
8 [1981] 11 ENV'T REP. (BNA) 2131. One of the regulations, 46 Fed. Reg. 8260, con-
cerned effluent guidelines for the timber products industry. The other, 46 Fed. Reg. 9404,
concerned general pre-treatment standards for controlling industrial discharges into munici-
pal sewage systems.
9 Exec. Order No. 12291, 46 Fed. Reg. 13193 (1981).
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eral of which are critical to the water pollution abatement program,
have been listed as "high-priority targets" for OMB review.' 0 Further,
the Executive Order required the agencies to prepare a Regulatory Im-
pact Analysis to ensure that "the potential benefits to society for the
regulation outweigh the potential costs to society.
B. EPA BUDGET REDUCTIONS
EPA's ability to abate water pollution will also be substantially re-
duced by recent budget cutbacks. Responding to President Reagan's
call for reduced federal spending, Congress slashed EPA funds in the
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981.12 EPA's sewage treatment
construction grants program, granting funds to qualifying municipali-
ties, was hardest hit by the Reconciliation Act's cutbacks. The fiscal
year 1981 budget had originally allocated $3.6 billion to this program.
The Reconciliation Act revised this allocation to approximately $2.5 bil-
lion, a thirty-two percent decrease in funding.13 The Reconciliation Act
also reduced EPA funds for research and for pollution abatement, con-
trol and compliance activities.14 EPA, then, will operate without much
of the funding previously directed toward the enforcement of water pol-
lution regulations through monitoring of pollution sources, issuance of
compliance orders and initiation of legal proceedings.
The effects of this funding reduction will be magnified by an Exec-
utive Order imposing a hiring freeze on all civilian government employ-
ees.' 5 Moreover, EPA Administrator Anne M. Gorsuch will further
trim EPA spending by dismissing, in the 1982 and 1983 fiscal years,
10 The OMB will review regulations concerning "best conventional control technology
effluent guidelines" for several industries, electroplating pre-treatment standards, and the
hazardous waste disposal program. [1981] 11 ENV'T REP. (BNA) 1852.
11 Exec. Order No. 12290 § 2(b), 46 Fed. Reg. 13193 (1981). See also OMB Interim Gui-
dance to Federal Agencies on Preparing Cost-Benefit Analysis of Regulations (June 13, 1981),
reprinted in [1981] 12 ENV'T REP. (BNA) 258.
12 Pub. L. No. 97-35, § 1801, 95 Stat. 764 (1981).
13 [1981] 39 CONG. Q. WEEKLY REP. (CONG. Q.) 1475. More importantly, the program
will receive no funds for fiscal year 1982 unless legislation is enacted reforming the municipal
sewage treatment construction grant program, in which case authorization shall not exceed
$2.4 billion. Id at 1476. Although the sewage program, a major part of the pollution abate-
ment effort, has long been criticized as inefficient, the dramatic funding cutbacks and possible
moratorium mark a sharp break with past pollution control efforts. Since 1972, the govern-
ment has spent over $33 billion on the program, "the largest civilian construction program
other than federal highways." Id at 1475. The Reagan Administration, however, plans to
curtail this spending; President Reagan plans to reduce the government's projected $90 bil-
lion obligation under the program to $23 billion by the year 2000. Id at 1043. This cutback
will ultimately result in a long overdue revamping of the sewage treatment program, but it
comes at a time when municipalities have little money to construct needed sewage treatment
plants.
14 [1981] 12 ENV'T. REP. (BNA) 461.
15 [1981] 39 CONG. Q. WEEKLY REP. (CONG. Q.) 163.
[Vol. 73
FEDERAL WATER POLLUTION LAWS
3,200 of the 10,381 full-time employees, a 31% reduction in agency man-
power from 1981.16
C. EPA REORGANIZATION
The federal pollution control effort has also been reduced by the
recent EPA reorganization. The Office of Enforcement, committed
solely to the prosecution of violators of environmental laws, was elimi-
nated in 1981.17 The individual enforcement divisions of different of-
fices, including the new Office of Water, will now enforce environmental
laws.' 8 Although EPA Administrator Gorsuch claimed that the reorgan-
ization was ,effected to "streamline" operations, the elimination may
substantially decrease the enforcement program, a critical aspect of
EPA's abatement effort. ' 9 The elimination of the Office of Enforcement
and the placement of enforcement coordination in an office formerly
devoted only to defensive litigation could lead to a less active enforce-
ment approach. Further, the dispersal of enforcement responsibility in
the various offices will doubtlessly detract from a coherent, unified en-
forcement effort. As former EPA Administrator Douglas Costle said,
"[I]t [the reorganization] may paralyze the EPA."
'20
Moreover, EPA officials recently declared that all criminal enforce-
ment actions must be reported and cleared through EPA headquarters
prior to prosecution. 2 1 This new requirement of a "Case Opening Re-
port" and a "Monthly Investigation Report" will delay and impede the
enforcement effort because of the time required to review each action.
22
Further, it will diminish the federal enforcement effort by giving greater
control over the enforcement program to top EPA officials who were
appointed because of their commitment to the Reagan Administration's
16 N.Y. Times, Sept. 29, 1981, at A20, col. 1. This decrease will be accentuated by EPA's
projected annual loss of six percent of its members due to attrition. Reacting to the decreases
in spending and planned employee reductions, former EPA Administrator Douglas Costle
said, "This is not a question of saving money for the budget, this is a wrecking crew at work."
Id
17 EPA Reorganization Memorandum (June 12, 1981).
18 The office of Legal Counsel and Enforcement-formerly the Office of Regional Coun-
sel, which participated only in defensive litigation-will now oversee agency-wide enforce-
ment activities. Id
19 INSIDE E.P.A., WEEKLY REP., June 19, 1981, at 1.
20 NEWSWEEK, Oct. 19, 1981, at 67. Concerning the paucity of enforcement actions,
Newsweek said, "EPA's enforcement of Federal air-and water-pollution laws has slowed to a
crawl. . . ." Id
21 Memorandum from Acting Director, Office of Criminal Enforcement, re: "Role of Re-
gional Administrators in Criminal Enforcement" (Apr. 27, 1981).
22 "The introduction of a two tiered review process in Headquarters. . .will only serve to
add time to the process and complicate the coordination of the referral." Memorandum from
Director, Enforcement Division, EPA Region V, to Acting Director, Office of Criminal En-
forcement, in response to proposal of a new review system for criminal cases (Apr. 13, 1981).
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philosophy of reducing agency interference with industry.23 The
number of prosecutions, then, will be determined by the top officials'
decision to approve or refuse to allow prosecution.
24
The reorganization and reporting requirements have already led to
a significantly decreased enforcement effort. In 1980, EPA referred 230
cases for prosecution. In the eight months since Gorsuch has been in
command, EPA has referred only forty-two.
25
D. ADDITIONAL CONSTRAINTS ON EPA
Although EPA's pollution abatement program has been diminished
primarily by actions taken by the Reagan Administration, prior meas-
ures, including the Equal Access to Justice Act, may also impede the
enforcement effort.26 Passed in 1980 and taking effect on October 1,
1981, the Act requires government agencies to pay attorneys' fees and
related costs to individuals and small businesses in regulatory cases
when the proceeding was not "substantially justified."' 27 The Act, which
23 Although Gorsuch explains her actions in terms of "streamlining" and reducing ineffi-
ciency, her actions have demonstrated that environmental protection is not a high priority.
Since taking office, Gorsuch has cut spending on every major program, including the one that
she says deserves top funding priority-the "superfund" to clean up abandoned toxic dump
sites. "She has also urged major retrenchments in the Clean Air Act; .. .she proposed a
three-year delay and substantial weakening of impending carbon monoxide emission stan-
dards .. " TIME, Jan. 18, 1982, at 16.
Gorsuch's critics do not believe that efficiency has been her only motive. "William Car-
ney,. . . ranking minority member of the Science and Technology Committee's subcommit-"
tee on natural resources. . . complained of'disturbing signs of late' emanating from the EPA
that its commitment to environmental protection 'may be wavering' . . . . Carney said the
reorganization and appointments [to top EPA positions] indicated a reduced emphasis on
enforcement and 'a more pro-industry stance than has been taken in the past.'" [1981] 39
CONG. Q. WEEKLY REP. (CONG. Q.) 1398.
Moreover, Representative James J. Florio, Chairman of the House Energy and Com-
merce Subcommittee on Commerce, Transportation, and Tourism, which oversees several
EPA programs, has demanded Gorsuch's resignation because the "massive program reduc-
tions, severe personnel cuts, and gutting of regulations demonstrate that she has no intention
whatsoever of carrying out her obligations under the law." [1981] 12 ENV'T REP. (BNA) 811.
24 Most lower level staff members appear more firmly committed to environmental pro-
tection than Gorsuch. Interview with EPA Attorney (Jan. 31, 1982). Since she began restruc-
turing EPA and dismantling EPA programs, over 10% of EPA staff members have resigned.
Moreover, Time magazine reports of "dismal morale" among staff members, and that some
unhappy employees are leaking controversial memorandums to the press revealing Gorsuch's
crippling actions. TIME, Jan. 18, 1982, at 16. See also WASH. MONTHLY, Dec. 1981, at 36,
which notes the tension between a deregulation-minded Gorsuch and staff members seeking a
continued strong pollution control effort.
25 TIME, Jan. 18, 1982, at 16.
26 5 U.S.C. § 504 (1980).
27 5 U.S.C. § 504(a)(1) (1980). "The test of whether or not a Government action is sub-
stantially justified is essentially one of reasonableness. Where the Government can show that
its case had a reasonable basis both in law and fact, no award will be made." H.R. No. 1418,
96th Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1980).
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was designed to be "an instrument for curbing excessive regulation and
the unreasonable exercise of Government authority,"'28 may cause regu-
latory agencies to initiate fewer proceedings.
Section 504(d)(1)(A) of the Act authorizes the appropriation to
each agency of funds to cover fees and costs awarded to plaintiffs, but
Congress has not yet allocated any funds for this purpose. Without ap-
propriated funds, agencies such as EPA would have to pay awards out of
their own operating funds. EPA may therefore be reluctant to risk its
dwindling resources for the payment of fees, and thus may refrain from
prosecuting due to the possibility that the action might be deemed "sub-
stantially unjustified.
'29
Faced with reductions in funds, postponement of major regulations,
elimination of the Office of Enforcement, and a deregulation-minded
Administrator, EPA may be unable to control water pollution. While
funds and regulations are disappearing, water pollution problems are
not.30 To prevent significant deterioration of the nation's waters, EPA
must utilize its diminished resources in an efficient enforcement scheme.
Equally important, the courts' treatment of environmental issues will
have a large impact on the enforcement effort. The following sections of
this Comment will present a brief overview of major water pollution
laws, discuss how the courts' treatment of issues affect enforcement, and
suggest how EPA may attempt to prevent further degradation of our
waterways.
II. OVERVIEW OF WATER POLLUTION STATUTES
Two federal statutes have been used in water pollution enforcement
actions. One statute, the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899 (Refuse
Act),31 prohibits the discharge or deposit of "any refuse matter of any
kind or description whatever other than that flowing from streets and
sewers and passing therefrom . . . into any navigable waters. '32 Al-
though initially used to prosecute creators of obstructions to navigation,
in the late 1960's the Refuse Act was applied to proscribe industrial pol-
lution. Section 411 provides for a fine of not less than $500 nor more
than $2,500 and/or imprisonment for one year or less, for any person or
corporation violating or aiding and abetting a violation of the Act.
33
28 H.R. No. 96-1418, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1980).
29 Chi. Tribune, Sept. 14, 1981, § 1, at 3, col. 1.
30 See supra notes 2-3 and accompanying text.
3' 33 U.S.C. §§ 401-67 (1976).
32 Id at § 407.
33 33 U.S.C. § 411 (1976). The minimal fines have not been revised since the passage of
the Refuse Act. For a detailed discussion of the history and application of the Refuse Act, see
Glenn, The Crime of "Pollution'". The Role of Federal Water Pollution Criminal Sanctions, 11 AM.
CRIM. L. REv. 835, 839-59 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Crime of Pollution]; Note, FederalEnforce-
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The other statute, the Federal Water Pollution Control Act of
1972,34 which provides both for civil and criminal penalties, is most fre-
quently applied in enforcement actions. The Act prohibits the dis-
charge of all pollutants unless- the discharge complies with a National
Pollution Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permit granted by
EPA or by a state with an approved program.35 Section 1319(d) states
that any person violating a permit condition is subject to civil penalties
not to exceed $10,000 per day of violation. 36 The FWPCA also provides
for criminal penalties. Section 1319(c)(2) states that the falsification of
documents filed under the permit system is punishable by a maximum
fine of $10,000 for each violation, and/or maximum imprisonment of six
months. 37 Section 1319(c) (1) provides penalties for the willful or negli-
gent violation of "any permit condition or limitation . . .issued under
section 1342. .... -38 Convictions under section 1319(c)(1) are punish-
able by fines of not less than $2,500 nor more than $25,000 per day of
violation and/or imprisonment of one year or less.39 Previous enforce-
ment efforts have applied almost exclusively the civil sanctions of the
FWPCA, but prosecutors are now utilizing its criminal provisions as
well.
40
III. EPA's ROLE IN ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS
A. THE ADMINISTRATOR'S DUTY TO ACT PURSUANT TO A FINDING
OF A VIOLATION: MANDATORY OR DISCRETIONARY?
Although the courts have recently construed the criminal provi-
sions of the FWPCA, varying interpretations have led to continued liti-
ment of Individual and Corporate Criminal Lzabilijy for Water Pollution, 10 MEM. ST. U.L. REv. 576,
583-85 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Federal Enforcement].
34 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-376 (1976).
35 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (1976).
36 33 U.S.C. § 1319(d) (1976).
37 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(2) (1976).
38 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(1) (1976).
39 Id Repeat violators of § 1319(c)(1) are subject to punishment of not more than
$50,000 per day of violation and/or not more than two years imprisonment. Id.
40 "Traditionally ... EPA has relied on administrative actions and civil litigation to en-
force environmental standards. The third enforcement option, criminal prosecution, has
rarely been used by the Agency. With the maturity of the air and water enforcement pro-
grams ... it is clear that the deterrent effect of criminal sanctions has become a more appro-
priate enforcement response to many situations." FY 1981 Criminal Enforcement Strategy
Memorandum, U.S.E.P.A. Region V, at 1 [hereinafter cited as Enforcement Strategy].
Several commentaries discuss the history of the FWPCA and focus on recent applications
of the criminal provisions. See Olds, Unkovic, & Lewin, Thoughts on the Role of Penalties in the
Enforcement of the Clean Air and Clean Water Acts, 17 DuQ. L. REv. 1 (1979) [hereinafter cited as
Thoughts]; White-Collar Crne." A Surug of Law, 18 AM. CRiM. L. REV. 169, 345-70 (1980)
[hereinafter cited as White Collar Crime]; Note, Criminal Prosecution Under the Federal Water Pollu-
tion Control Act, 56 CH. KENT L. REV. 983 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Criminal Prosecution].
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gation on several issues. Consistent treatment of issues regarding the
criminal provisions will partially determine the nature and effectiveness
of the enforcement effort. 33 U.S.C. § 1319(a)(3) reads:
Whenever on the basis of any information available to him the Adminis-
trator [of EPA] finds that any person is in violation of. . . [the discharge
permit provisions of the FWPCA], he shall issue an order requiring such
person to comply with such section or requirement, or he shall bring a civil
action in accordance with subsection (b) of this section.
One issue, of particular importance in light of the decrease in EPA
resources, 41 is whether the EPA Administrator has a mandatory or a
discretionary duty to take action against a violator after finding a viola-
tion of a FWPCA provision. The few courts addressing the issue have
not consistently interpreted section 1319. If future courts construe the
duty imposed as mandatory, then the Administrator would be required
to take action pursuant to a finding of a violation. This requirement
would limit the attempt by EPA headquarters to reduce the number of
enforcement actions.
In Sierra Club v. Train ,42 a citizen's suit brought to compel the EPA
Administrator to issue pollution abatement orders, the Fifth Circuit
held that section 1319(a) (3) imposes only a discretionary duty to issue an
abatement order. The court discussed the voluminous legislative history
of the FWPCA, finding that the Conference Committee had accepted a
House amendment which provided that the Administrator was author-
ized to initiate civil and criminal proceedings, whereas the Senate bill
had provided that section 1319(a)(3) required him to take action.43
The court failed, however, to consider all of the pertinent legislative
history. During the Senate's discussion of the Conference Committee
Report, Senator Muskie, the Chairman of the Senate Committee on
Public Works, stated that although the change in language made civil
enforcement discretionary, it did not affect the Administrator's
mandatory duty to issue an abatement order:
It is important to note, however, that the provisions requiring the Adminis-
trator to issue an abatement order whenever there is a violation were
mandatory in both the Senate bill and House amendment and the Confer-
ence agreement contemplates that the Administrator's duty to issue an
abatement order remains a mandatory one.44
41 See subra notes 4-30 and accompanying text.
42 557 F.2d 485 (5th Cir. 1977).
43 Id at 489.
44 ENV'TL. POLICY Div., CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERV., LIBRARY OF CONGRESS
93RD CONG., 1ST SESs., A LEGISLATIvE HISTORY OF THE WATER POLLUTION CONTROL
AcT AMENDMENTS OF 1972 174 (Comm. Print 1973) [hereinafter cited as LEGISLATIVE HIS-
TORY] (remarks of Senator Muskie). See South Carolina Wildlife Federation v. Alexander,
457 F. Supp. 118, 131 (D.S.C. 1978), which rejected Train on these grounds.
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Three district courts have held that the Administrator has a
mandatory duty to act under section 1319(a)(3). Two years before
Train, the court in United States v. Phelps Dodge Corp. ,'45 found that the
Administrator was required to act after learning of a violation. Al-
though Phelps concerned the initiation of criminal charges, the court
said that the mandatory duty to act requires the Administrator to take
some action--either by the issuance of an abatement order, by a notifi-
cation to the violator to cease his illegal activity, by civil proceedings, or
by criminal proceedings.
46
Two years later, in Illinois ex. rel Scott v. Hojnan,4 an action to
compel the Administrator to act pursuant to the FWPCA, another dis-
trict court relied on Phelps to hold that the Administrator, upon finding
a violation, has a mandatory duty either to issue an abatement order or
to institute other proceedings to ensure compliance with the FWPCA.
48
One year after Train a district court held in South Carolina Wildlife
Federation v. Alexander49 that the duty to issue an abatement order was
mandatory. The court first discussed whether the word "shall" imposed
a mandatory or discretionary duty. Citing Escoe v. Zerbst 50 for the propo-
sition that " 'shall' is the language of command," the court concluded
that "shall" usually imposes a mandatory duty.5 1 Although this rule of
construction is not absolute,52 "where the statute's purpose is the protec-
tion of public or private rights, as opposed to merely providing guidance
for government officials, courts usually interpret 'shall' as imposing
mandatory rather than directory [sic] duties. 5 3 The court stated that
since Congress granted the Administrator enforcement authority under
the FWPCA to protect the public's interest in unpolluted waterways,
section 1319(a) (3) imposes a mandatory duty.
5 4
By comparing analogous provisions of the Clean Air Act and the
FWPCA, the court found further support for imposing a mandatory
45 391 F. Supp. 1181, 1184 (D. Ariz. 1975).
46 Id
47 425 F. Supp. 71 (S.D. Ill. 1977).
48 Id at 77.
49 457 F. Supp. 118, 134 (D.S.C. 1978).
50 295 U.S. 490, 493 (1935).
51 457 F. Supp. at 130.
52 Id
53 Id
54 Id at 131. The court presented additional policy considerations to support its holding.
It stated that in light of the FWPCA's declared goal that "the discharge of pollutants into the
navigable waterways be eliminated by 1985 .... ." 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(1), "it would be
inconsistent with this broad remedial purpose for this Court to hold, less than seven years
from this target date, that the Administrator can ignore a violation once it is called to his
attention." 457 F. Supp. at 133.
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duty.55 Whereas 42 U.S.C. § 7413(a) (3) of the Clean Air Act states that
the Administrator "may" take action upon finding a violation, section
1319(a)(3), the corresponding provision of the FWPCA, provides that
the Administrator "shall" take enforcement action. The court con-
cluded that this different wording showed that "Congress very deliber-
ately intended to impose more under the FWPCA than just the
discretionary duty which the Clean Air Act imposes on the Administra-
tor. The duty intended to be imposed is a mandato y one."156 Further, the
court rejected the analysis of the Train opinion because it failed to con-
sider Senator Muskie's comments.
57
In light of EPA's less active enforcement of environmental regula-
tions, consistent treatment of this issue could substantially affect EPA's
role in the pollution control effort. If the Administrator has a discretion-
ary duty to issue abatement orders or take other action, as Train holds,
and if the Administrator's policy is to reduce agency interference in
business decision-making, then EPA could minimize the number of en-
forcement actions merely by electing not to act upon findings of
violations.
The South Carolina opinion, however, is more compelling than Train;
it accurately relies on the legislative history, persuasively construes the
provisions of the FWPCA, and presents important policy considerations
for imposing a mandatory duty on the Administrator. Courts therefore
should follow South Carolina and require that the Administrator act upon
finding a violation.
This result would encourage prosecution of violations under the
FWPCA. It is not EPA headquarters, but rather the regional offices
which authorize the investigations of possible violations.5 8 Since the
staff members in the regional offices appear committed to the pollution
abatement effort, 59 they will probably continue to investigate viola-
tions.60 Once a finding of a violation is made,6' EPA would then be
required to act against the violator, either by the issuance of an abate-
55 In drafting the enforcement provisions of the FWPCA, the Senate Committee "drew
extensively" on the Clean Air Act. Id at 131, citing LEGISLATIVE HISTOR7, supra note 44,
vol. 1 at 1481.
56 Id at 132.
57 Id See supra notes 42-44 and accompanying text.
58 Interview with EPA Attorney (Jan. 31, 1982).
59 See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
60 Interview with EPA Attorney (Jan. 31, 1982). However, because EPA will have less
manpower and money to investigate potential violations, EPA will doubtlessly discover fewer
violations than it has in the past.
61 Neither section 1319(a) (3) nor EPA regulations define a "finding." Rather, a finding is
ajudgment made at the regional level that a discharger has violated the FWPCA. Because
EPA does not have the resources to act on all violations, EPA will find a violation in the "high
priority" cases where the polluter has discharged substantially or consistently more than his
1982]
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ment order or by the institution of civil or criminal proceedings. Thus,
despite the reduction in resources and the anti-regulatory philosophy of
top EPA officials, EPA could still enforce the permit requirements of the
FWPCA.
B. WHETHER THE ADMINISTRATOR MUST, BEFORE INITIATING
CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS, ISSUE AN ABATEMENT ORDER?
A related issue is whether, after finding a violation of a permit con-
dition, the EPA Administrator must first issue an abatement order or
take civil action before pursuing a criminal remedy. The courts' treat-
ment of this issue takes on added significance when considered in con-
junction with the present decreases in funding and EPA manpower.
62
33 U.S.C. § 1319(c) (1) provides: "Any person who willfully or neg-
ligently violates . . . [the discharge permit provisions of the FWPCA]
shall be punished by a fine of not less than $2,500 nor more than
$25,000 per day of violation, or by imprisonment for not more than one
year, or by both." The Act does not specify whether an abatement or-
der or civil proceeding must precede the initiation of criminal charges.
The three courts that have directly addressed the issue have held
that the Administrator need not take prior action before initiating crim-
inal proceedings. In Un'ted States v. Phelps Dodge Corp. ,63 the district
court discussed the conflicting legislative history and concluded that the
Administrator could initiate criminal proceedings without first issuing
an abatement order or taking civil action. The court noted that in the
House debate on this provision, one Congressman stated that a criminal
action could not be brought unless the Administrator first issues an
permit condition allows. Thus, a finding results from a balancing of different factors such as
availability of resources and egregiousness of the violation.
A related issue, briefly discussed in South Carolina, is whether the Administrator himself
must find a violation or whether the Administrator may be deemed to have made a finding
from the receipt of information from outside sources such as public interest groups, other
agencies or citizens. The Administrator had not made an express finding, but rather had
learned of the violation from plaintiff South Carolina Wildlife Federation. The court skirted
the issue, stating that for the purposes of the motion to dismiss, it could not, as a matter of
law, hold that no finding had been made. 457 F. Supp. at 130.
South Carohlna and Hofman illustrate that an outside party may compel the Administrator
to act against a violator if a finding has been made. More often, however, public interest
groups or citizens merely alert EPA to investigate a potential violation. Because these outside
parties do not have the authority to enter a plant to determine whether the corporation com-
plies with its permit, and because they lack the expertise to analyze effluent discharges,
outside parties rarely can accurately determine that a discharger is violating a permit condi-
tion. Instead, the outside parties notify EPA about potential violations. Because investiga-
tions are performed by regional staff members, rather than by top EPA officials, the
complaints will probably be acted upon. Interview with EPA Attorney (Jan. 31, 1982).
62 See supra notes 12-16 and accompanying text.
63 391 F. Supp. at 1184.
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abatement order which, if not heeded, could be followed by criminal
proceedings.64 However, the court found more persuasive the House
Committee Report which provided:
[H]e [the Administrator] may take any of the following enforcement ac-
tions: (1) he shall issue an order requiring compliance; (2) he shall notify
the person in alleged violation. . . of such finding. If beyond the 30th day
after the Administrator's notification, the State has not commenced appro-
priate enforcement action, the Administrator shall issue an order requiring
such person to comply with a permit or a condition or limitation of a per-
mit; or (3) he shall bring a civil action; or (4) he shall cause to be instituted
criminal proceedings.
65
Because this report contained other language which later became part of
section 1319(c), the court found that the Committee's Report was con-
trolling and therefore held that Congress did not intend to require that
the Administrator issue an abatement order before initiating criminal
proceedings.
66
In United States v. Hudson Farms,67 another district court approved
the result in Phelps, but cautioned that because the statute is "silent"
and the legislative history "in conflict," it would be difficult to clear up
"these comparatively murky waters." 68 The court ruled nonetheless
that because section 1319(c)(1) made no mention of a civil prerequisite
for criminal actions, Congress did not intend to impose such a
prerequisite.
69
The Third Circuit in United States v. Frezzo Bros. ,70 relied on Phelps
and Hudson in holding that the Administrator was not required to issue
an abatement order before filing a criminal action. The court cited
much of the legislative history considered in Phelps, acknowledging that
it was conflicting, but said that the prerequisites would unduly hamper
the government's efforts to impose criminal sanctions on violators.
7 1
Thus, the courts that have directly addressed the issue have held
that the Administrator may commence criminal proceedings without
having to take prior action once a violation is found. 72 Neither the stat-
ute's language nor the legislative history compels this conclusion, but
64 Id at 1183 (citing Representative Harsha's remarks, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note
44, at 530).
65 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 44, at 114.
66 391 F. Supp. at 1184.
67 12 ENv'T. REP. CAS. 1444 (E.D. Pa. 1978).
68 Id at 1445.
69 Id at 1446.
70 602 F.2d 1123 (3d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1074 (1980).
71 Id at 1126.
72 But see Illinois ex. rel Scott v. Hoffman, 425 F. Supp. at 77, in which the court said, but




the decisions are supported by the courts' stated policy of refusing to
impede the criminal enforcement effort. If courts follow these prece-
dents, EPA could seek criminal sanctions without first having to issue an
abatement order or take civil action. This streamlining of enforcement
procedure will facilitate prompt criminal prosecutions, essential both to
preserve evidence of the violation and to ensure the greatest amount of
deterrence. 73 Moreover, if EPA is not required to engage in a two-step
enforcement procedure-first issuing an order and then deciding
whether to prosecute-it can quickly bring charges against a violator.
This streamlined process would lead to greater deterrence of potential
violators who would not have the benefit of first receiving an abatement
order before having to comply with discharge regulations.
74
These decisions are of particular importance in light of the dwin-
dling EPA resources. The threat of immediate criminal prosecution will
deter a greater number of potential violators. Such additional deter-
rence is necessary to prevent dischargers, aware of EPA's inability to
prosecute all violators, from disregarding permit requirements.
C. THE ROLES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE AND THE
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY
Because of diminished EPA resources and enforcement efforts,75 the
pollution abatement program will be weakened unless other govern-
ment agencies and departments enforce water pollution laws. A recent
decision 76 approving a criminal prosecution initiated by the Depart-
ment of Justice (DOJ) may lead to greater DOJ participation in the
enforcement effort. Such DOJ assistance could mitigate the effects of
EPA's retreat from an active prosecutorial role.
In most FWPCA criminal cases, EPA investigates the alleged viola-
tion and makes the initial decision to prosecute the violator. Prior to the
reorganization of EPA and elimination of the Enforcement Division, the
Legal Section Chief of the regional office would confer with a litigation
screening committee to decide whether criminal proceedings were ap-
73 The deterrent effect is reduced when there is a great delay between time of violation
and time of conviction. ENFORCEMENT STRATEGY, supra note 40, at 1.
74 This strategy is essential for the deterrence of single-incident, "Midnight Dumping"
violations of the FWPCA, where the detection of the violation and identification of the
dumper may be difficult or impossible. "Midnight dumping" occurs, for example, when a
chemical disposal company unlawfully discharges toxic chemicals into a waterway. If EPA
first had to issue an abatement order, then the company could possibly clean up the discharge
before criminal charges could be brought. This would not deter the next company, which
could discharge subject only to the risk of receiving an abatement order. If EPA prosecutes
the discharger immediately upon discovery of the discharge, however, companies would be
less likely to pollute.
75 See supra notes 12-25 and accompanying text.
76 United States v. Oxford Royal Mushroom Products, 487 F. Supp. 852 (E.D. Pa. 1980).
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propriate for the case in question. 77 If the committee decided to com-
mence criminal proceedings, it would prepare a Prosecution Referral
Package and transmit it to the Office of the U.S. Attorney. If the Office
of the U.S. Attorney decided to prosecute, it would commence the ac-
tion, relying on EPA for assistance.
78
The details of the post-reorganization procedure have not yet been
resolved, but EPA will continue to refer cases to the Office of the U.S.
Attorney after it has decided that criminal proceedings are warranted.7 9
Thus, EPA will still investigate violations and decide initially whether
the violator should be prosecuted.
EPA efforts may be supplemented by increased participation in the
criminal enforcement effort by DOJ. The Department of Justice Appro-
priation Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 1980 (Appropriation Act) pro-
vides that "The Attorney General may, with the concurrence of any
agency or Department with primary enforcement responsibility for an
environmental or natural resource law, investigate any violation, of an
environmental or natural resource law of the United States, and bring
such actions as are necessary to enforce such laws."80
The court in United States v. Oxford Royal Mushroom Products,8' relied
on the Appropriation Act to uphold a criminal enforcement action initi-
ated by DOJ, notwithstanding the fact that the FWPCA authorizes only
EPA to act after finding a violation. In Oxford, the defendants were
charged with, inter alia, violating section 1311(a) of the FWPCA. The
U.S. Attorney had investigated the violation and had decided to prose-
cute, relying on assistance from EPA's Surveillance and Analysis
Division.82
The defendants contended that this prosecution violated their sub-
stantive due process rights because the U.S. Attorney, not EPA, started
the investigation and decided to prosecute. Rejecting this argument, the
77 ENFORCEMENT STRATEGY, supra note 40, at 7-9.
78 Id (In EPA memorandums and in Oxford, the agency and the court refer to the Office
of the U.S. Attorney and DOJ as the same entity. Although it is confusing, this Comment
refers to the different departments as they are referred to in the memorandums and in Oxford).
79 Memorandum from Acting Assistant EPA Administrator for Enforcement re: "Report-
ing Procedures for Investigations into Potential Criminal Violations of Environmental Stat-
utes" at 2 (May 5, 1981).
80 Pub. L. No. 96-132 § 12, 93 Stat. 1040, 1048 (1979). The legislative history reveals that
Congress intended that DOJ take a greater role in the prosecution of violators of environmen-
tal laws: "This section is meant to clarify that the Land and Natural Resources Division,
under the supervision of the Attorney General, has the affirmative duty to protect the envi-
ronment and to enforce environmental and natural resource laws when evidence of their
violation comes to his attention from any source." S. REP. No. 173, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 15.
81 487 F. Supp. 852.
82 Traditionally, the Enforcement Division would assist in the prosecution. The defend-
ants' claim was based on the fact that the Enforcement Division played an insignificant role
in the investigation and prosecution. Id at 856.
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court stated: "While it is generally the Director of the Enforcement Di-
vision [of EPA] . . . who makes enforcement decisions for Region
Three, the mere fact that the enforcement decision was made by the
U.S. Attorney in this case does not render the decision constitutionally
defective. "83
In approving DOJ's decision to prosecute, the court emphasized
that EPA was substantially involved in the investigative stages, the Sur-
veillance and Analysis Division contributed heavily to the data gather-
ing process, and the Regional Administrator of EPA acknowledged and
permitted this assistance.84 The court noted that because of "the sup-
port that the EPA provided and the concurrence in the enforcement
division," it could not conclude that EPA would have proceeded in a
different manner had the case been handled in accordance with the
usual procedures. 85 In the absence of evidence that the Administrator's
discretion was deliberately bypassed, the court held that the unusual
procedure did not render the prosecution invalid.
6
Oxford, however, does not allow DOJ to investigate and prosecute
violations in total disregard of EPA's enforcement role. The Appropria-
tion Act authorizes DOJ to act "with the concurrence of any agency or
Department with primary enforcement responsibility for an environ-
mental . . . law. .... -87 The court did not define "concurrence" but
implied that initiation of proceedings by DOJ would be permissible
when there was substantial cooperation between DOJ and EPA. Subse-
quent judicial constructions of the word "concurrence" will determine,
in part, how much independence DOJ will have in the initiation of
criminal proceedings. If courts hold that EPA must participate signifi-
cantly in prosecutions, then DOJ's role could be minimized by EPA's
current passive enforcement effort. 88 If, however, courts allow prosecu-
tions where EPA has played an insignificant role, then DOJ could more
readily prosecute violators.
By prosecuting environmental violators, DOJ could help reduce the
water quality deterioration resulting from EPA's substantially dimin-
ished pollution abatement effort. DOJ has traditionally been well





87 Pub. L. No. 96-132 § 12, 93 Stat. 1040, 1048 (1979) (emphasis added).
88 See supra note 17-25 and accompanying text.
89 DOJ, unlike EPA, may use the FBI to assist in the investigation of criminal violations.
Interview with EPA Attorney (Jan. 31, 1982).
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experienced budget cutbacks reducing its ability to prosecute.9 0 It is not
clear, however, what role DOJ will play in the pollution control effort.
During the Carter Administration, DOJ actively prosecuted violators of
the FWPCA.9 1 The Attorney General, William French Smith, has
demonstrated his commitment to preventing street crimes, but has not
indicated whether DOJ will continue to prosecute environmental viola-
tors. 9 2 Because water pollution remains a serious problem, and because
EPA is neither able nor willing to adequately confront it, it is imperative
that DOJ investigate and prosecute violations of the FWPCA.
IV. ENFORCEMENT STRATEGIES: THE MOST EFFICIENT APPROACH
While the courts' treatment of the issues discussed above will par-
tially determine the effectiveness of the pollution control program, an-
other important factor is the efficiency of the enforcement approach.
This section of the Comment discusses the most efficient means of induc-
ing compliance from municipalities and corporations.
A. MUNICIPAL VIOLATORS
Municipalities affect water quality through the operation of sewage
and water treatment plants. Because these facilities serve large portions
of the population, they have a great impact on human health. Many
municipalities do not have adequate plants. EPA estimated that sixty-
three percent of major municipal treatment facilities were not yet in
compliance with 1977 statutory deadlines requiring secondary treat-
ment or more stringent treatment necessary to meet water quality stan-
90 DOJ's funding was relatively untouched by the cutbacks in the Omnibus Reconcilia-
tion Act of 1981. [1981] 39 CONG. Q. WEEKLY REP. (CONG. Q.) 1474.
91 DOJ mounted a committed enforcement effort to deter corporate violations of the
FWPCA. In 1978, it added 20 attorneys to the pollution enforcement section and streamlined
enforcement procedures to allow for more effective prosecution of dischargers. See Federal En-
forcement, supra note 33, at 597-99.
92 The Attorney General's public statements have been directed "almost exclusively to-
ward drug traffic and violent crime." Wall St. J., Sept. 28, 1981, at 29, col. 3. Moreover, the
Attorney General's Task Force on Violent Crime recently recommended that the federal gov-
ernment devote more resources to law enforcement at a time when most other domestic pro-
grams are being cut back. N.Y. Times, Aug. 18, 1981, at A14, col. I.
DOJ appears less committed, however, to the prosecution of white-collar criminals. Al-
though the Reagan Administration has not publicly announced the decreased emphasis on
white-collar crime, critics in law enforcement believe resources are being diverted elsewhere.
Wall St. J., Sept. 28, 1981, at 29, col. 3. DOJ plans to dismiss 50% of the "economic-crime
specialists" currently responsible for investigating white-collar crime. Id
Regarding the Clean Air Act, Stephen Ramsey, DOJ chief of environmental enforce-
ment, stated that while the number of cases litigated-civil and criminal-would decrease,
use of criminal sanctions would increase. [1981] 12 ENV'T REP. (BNA) 895. DOJ has not
said, however, whether it will continue to prosecute violators of the FWPCA.
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dards.93 Further, over twenty percent of the community water supply
systems violated the maximum levels of microbiological contaminants,
turbidity, and chemical-radiological contaminants allowed under EPA's
Interim Primary Drinking Water Regulations. 94 Because contaminated
water supplies have been shown to cause human illness and disease, 95 it
is essential that municipalities comply with pollution regulations.
Municipalities and their subdivisions are subject to civil and crimi-
nal liability under the FWPCA and the Refuse Act, but courts have
rarely held them criminally liable. 96 In United States v. Dexter Corp. ,97 the
court reversed the criminal conviction of the North Shore Sanitary Dis-
trict, an Illinois municipal corporation. Co-defendant Dexter Corpora-
tion discharged refuse- into the municipal sewer system after a heavy
rainfall had flooded the sewage system, causing the untreated refuse to
enter Lake Michigan. The Sanitary District was convicted under sec-
tion 407 of the Refuse Act and fined $500. The Seventh Circuit reversed
the conviction on the ground that the statute exempted from liability
dischargers of refuse matter "flowing from the streets and sewers and
passing therefrom in a liquid state." 98
In United States v. City of New Albany,99 the former superintendent of
a municipal treatment plant pleaded guilty to charges of filing false dis-
93 Environmental Qualit, supra note 2, at 131.
94 Id at 116.
95 Id at 86. The CEQ report studied the impact on health of dangerous chemicals, such
as, carbon tetrachloride, found in drinking water supplies, concluding that "medical and sci-
entific evidence suggests that there are no safe levels of exposure." Id The report further
stated that different synthetic compounds, if ingested in small quantities in water, could cause
dizziness, nausea, and sometimes blindness. The report then discussed such factors as level of
exposure, toxicity of the chemicals and other factors which affect the severity of the illnesses.
96 Indeed, there has been little enforcement-civil or criminal-against municipalities.
Stephen Schroeder, former EPA enforcement attorney, testified at the EPA enforcement pro-
gram hearing held by a subcommittee of the Senate Committee, on Environmental and Pub-
lic Works, stating that in light of the fact that municipal facilities significantly affect water
quality, EPA has unwisely failed to enforce the FWPCA against municipalities and other
government agencies. Schroeder stated, "there has been virtually no formal enforcement"
against government facilities. [1979] 10 ENV'T REP. (BNA) 146.
97 507 F.2d 1038 (7th Cir. 1974).
98 Id at 1040. The Refuse Act provided this exception because the Act was originally
aimed at preventing the discharge of any refuse which impaired navigation, not abating in-
dustrial water pollution. See supra notes 31-33 and accompanying text. In 1960, however, the
Supreme Court interpreted this language of the Act to prohibit discharges of pollutants not
within the traditional category of hindrances to navigation. United States v. Republic Steel
Corp., 362 U.S. 482 (1960). Republic Steel did not resolve the construction of the exception;
the Court held that the exception applied to domestic sewage or other liquids in suspension
but did not include liquids in solution. Several courts have since limited the exception to
sewage. See While Collar Crzme, supra note 40, at 355. Still other courts, such as the Seventh
Circuit in Dexter, have held that the exception included untreated industrial wastes. Seegener-
all.y, Federal Enforcement, supra note 33, at 578.
99 Summarized in [1978] 9 ENV'T REP. (BNA) 485.
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charge reports to EPA, while the city pleaded nolo contendere to similar
charges. The discharge reports, signed by both the former superinten-
dent and the mayor, stated that the city was discharging effluents in
compliance with its permit condition. The former superintendent was
fined $1,500, while the city was ordered to pay only $20 in court costs. 00
Despite the fact that the mayor signed the reports, the court refused to
fine the city, stating that the mayor did not know that the reports were
false.1ot
In United States v. Little Rock Sewer Committee,10 2 the court upheld the
conviction of the Sewer Committee for knowingly filing a falsified dis-
charge report. The Plant Superintendent who had falsified the reports
was convicted under section 1319(c) (2) and sentenced to one year of pro-
bation.'0 3 Although no committee member knew that the reports were
falsified, the Committee was placed on probation for two years, subject
to the maximum fine if it failed to bring the sewage system into compli-
ance within a reasonable time.
10 4
Dexter, New Albany, and Little Rock illustrate that criminal sanctions
have not been successfully invoked against municipalities and their em-
ployees. First, few prosecutions have been brought. Second, municipal-
ities can avoid liability under the Refuse Act's exemption. Third, courts
have imposed insignificant penalties for criminal violations. 10 5 It is not
clear, however, why courts have been reluctant to impose substantial
criminal sanctions on municipalities. Perhaps it is unrealistic to expect
one government official-a judge-to imprison another government of-
ficial-a municipal officer-for a violation of a water pollution regula-
tion. Finally, "[I]t is difficult to force a city to pay a fine to the federal
treasury, and without an effective and credible sanction, EPA is in a
poor bargaining position with errant municipalities."'
10 6
There are fewer barriers to the imposition of civil sanctions against
municipalities. Recent decisions have rejected arguments that 33
U.S.C. § 1321 (b), imposing liability on "any owner, operator, or person"
in charge of a facility from which oil is discharged, does not apply to
100 Id
101 Id
102 460 F. Supp. 6 (E.D. Ark. 1978).
103 United States v. Ouelette, 11 ENV'T REP. CAS. 1350 (E.D. Ark. 1977).
104 Judgment and Commitment Order, United States v. Little Rock Sewer Committee,
460 F. Supp. 6 (E.D. Ark. 1978). After the conviction, the Sewer Committee implemented
new procedures and authorized the construction of additional facilities which doubled the
plant's capacity. With these improvements, the plant's performance was in compliance with
EPA standards, and probation was terminated twenty months after the conviction.
105 See supra notes 99-104 and accompanying text.
106 ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, supra note 2, at 123. Although there are no legal barriers
to collection, the enforcement effort against municipalities is impeded by the fact that the
government has few viable means of requiring municipalities to pay fines.
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municipalities. In United States v. Massachusetts Bay Transportation Author-
o,10
7 the First Circuit held that municipalities and their subdivisions
are not exempt from civil liability, although section 1321 does not ex-
pressly mention "municipalities." Additionally, in United States v. City of
New York, 10 8 an action to recover civil penalties imposed for the unlaw-
ful discharge of oil, the district court analyzed section 1321 and its legis-
lative history, finding that Congress "clearly intended" that
municipalities be subject to civil liability.109
Courts have also imposed substantial fines on municipalities. In
California v. San Francisco,1 10 the city of San Francisco was held liable for
polluting state waters under a California law modeled after the
FWPCA. Several unio's had struck, prompting the city to close its sew-
age treatment plants out of fear of the danger posed by unskilled opera-
tors running the plants. In six days, the city discharged 426,470,000
gallons of untreated sewage into the bay and ocean. The surrounding
waters accumulated dangerously high levels of pollutants, damaging
marine life and harming several citizens. The state sued for civil penali-
ties pursuant to the California Water Pollution Code,1 11 which "imple-
ments the Federal Water Pollution Control Act."' 112 At trial, the court
ruled that once the State proved a violation, "it became defendant's
burden to establish . . . that the amount of penalty imposed should be
less than the maximum." ' 1 3 The state was awarded the maximum civil
penalties of $500,000, which the trial court remitted to $350,000. The
Court of Appeals found that the trial court had incorrectly interpreted
107 614 F.2d 27 (Ist Cir. 1980).
108 481 F. Supp. 4 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), aJ'dmem., 614 F.2d 1292 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446
U.S. 936 (1980).
109 481 F. Supp. at 7. The court assessed the city fines amounting to $1,200 for five sepa-
rate discharges of oil into navigable waters.
In other cases involving municipal violators, courts have construed the FWPCA in a
manner which facilitates civil enforcement. In City of Baton Rouge v. United States Envtl.
Protection Agency, 620 F.2d 478 (5th Cir. 1980), the city sought court review of an EPA
abatement order requiring the city to submit a program to prevent the continued violation of
its discharge permit condition. The court dismissed the city's petition stating that orders were
reviewable only where section 1369(b)(1) of the Act specifically authorized review. Baton
Rouge, then, allows EPA to issue abatement orders without judicial interference.
In United States v. City of Colorado Springs, Colorado, 455 F. Supp. 1364 (D. Colo.
1978), the prosecution sought to permanently enjoin the city from violating its permit condi-
tion. The city claimed that since EPA had delegated to Colorado authority over the permit
system, the federal government was required to notify the state of the city's violation before
bringing suit. In dismissing this claim, the court said that the "compelling public policy
behind the Act" required a liberal interpretation of the FWPCA and held that the govern-
ment could either notify the state or proceed directly by suing the city. Id at 1366.
110 94 Cal. App. 3d 522, 156 Cal. Rptr. 542 (Ct. App. 1979).
111 CAL. WATER CODE §§ 13370, 13373, 13376, 13385 (West 1972).
112 94 Cal. App. 3d at 528, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 545.
113 Id at 531, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 546.
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the FWPCA and held that the maximum possible penalty was $60,000,
which the court then imposed.
114
Although the court construed the FWPCA in favor of the city by
reducing the fine, the court upheld the trial court's unusual ruling on
the proof of damages. 1 5 The court said that the alteration of the bur-
den of proof was justified "in exceptional cases where the effectuation of
public policy requires it. This is clearly such a case.""
16
Finally, the court reversed the trial court's decision that the striking
unions would be liable for all of the damages under a theory of indem-
nity. The court held that the damages would be apportioned between
the city and the unions on the basis of respective fault.
Although the effectiveness of the civil enforcement scheme will
largely depend on the severity of fines imposed, the municipality's abil-
ity to pay fines, and the government's ability to collect them, civil en-
forcement may be the most efficient means of inducing municipal
compliance. Massachusetts Bay, City of New York, and California v. San
Francisco facilitate civil enforcement of pollution regulations and suggest
that courts are not reluctant to impose civil penalties. In addition, civil
enforcement presents fewer obstacles than does criminal enforcement
since the burden of proof for civil violations of the FWPCA is "prepon-
derance of the evidence," rather than "proof beyond a reasonable
doubt."'7 Furthermore, the prosecutor does not need to prove negli-
gence or intent since neither are elements of civil offenses under the
FWPCA." 8 As one commentator noted, "Thus, pleading is simplified
and the application of a civil penalty becomes a more streamlined and
efficient process. ' 119 With fewer legal barriers and a greater likelihood
of civil fines, 120 EPA should maximize its limited resources in civil ac-
tions in order to induce the greatest compliance among municipalities.
B. CORPORATE VIOLATORS
An efficient enforcement program must also ensure compliance
114 Id at 530, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 546.
115 See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
116 94 Cal. App. at 531, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 546.
It7 O'Brien, The Use of Civil Penalties in Enfordng the Clean Water Act Amendments of 1977, 12
U.S.F.L. Rev. 437, 448 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Civil Penalties].
118 Id
119 Id
120 See United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242 (1980), which discusses the difference between
civil and criminal fines. To determine whether a penalty is civil or criminal, courts inquire
whether Congress intended to establish a civil penalty. Where Congress has so indicated,
courts next inquire "whether the statutory scheme was so punitive either in purpose or effect
as to negate that intention." Id at 249. The Court in Ward found that section 132 1(b)(6) of
the FWPCA-which imposed penalties for discharges of oil or other hazardous substances
from any vessel, onshore facility, or offshore facility-was civil in nature. Id at 255.
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from corporate dischargers. If potential violators perceive that EPA is
unable or unwilling to enforce pollution regulations, a total degradation
of water quality might result. This outcome could be avoided through
an intelligent use of criminal sanctions, even if EPA prosecutes fewer
cases.1
21
Courts have occasionally held corporations criminally liable for vio-
lations of the Refuse Act.' 22 Although the FWPCA has provided for
criminal sanctions since its passage in 1972, courts have only recently
imposed liability. In Apex Oil Co. v. United States, 123 the Eighth Circuit
broadly construed section 1321 (b) (5) of the FWPCA to hold a corpora-
tion liable for its failure to notify the government about oil spills from
the corporation's loading facility. While section 1321(b)(5) provides
that the "person in charge" may be subject to criminal sanctions, the
court said that Congress intended liability under the Act to extend to
corporations.1 24 Further, although only the supervisor of the loading
facility witnessed the spill and no directors or officers learned of the spill
until notified by the Coast Guard, the court held the corporation liable
for its failure to notify the government on the ground that "the knowl-
edge of the employee is the knowledge of the corporation."'' 25 While
this is a basic rule of agency law, 126 its application here is significant
because Apex marks the first time that vicarious corporate criminal lia-
bility has been imposed under the FWPCA.
127
The broad language of Apex, coupled with the court's willingness to
impute the knowledge of a loading facility supervisor to the corporation,
suggests that other corporations may be held liable for the acts of lower
level employees. Extending liability here creates "an important incen-
tive for a corporation to train and supervise its employees on the report-
ing requirements of the Act."'
128
121 See supra notes 19-25 and accompanying text.
122 See The Crime of Pollution, supra note 33, at 839-59 and Federal Enforcement, supra note 33,
at 583-85 for an overview of criminal enforcement under the Refuse Act.
123 530 F.2d 1291 (8th Cir. 1976).
124 Id at 1294.
125 Id at 1295 (footnote omitted).
126 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 9(3) (1958): "A person has notice of a fact
if his agent has knowledge of the fact . . . under circumstances coming within the rules ap-
plying to the liability of a principal because of notice to his agent."
127 Vicarious corporate criminal liability imposes liability on the corporation for the con-
duct of the employee. It did not exist at common law, but is now expressly and impliedly
imposed by statute. Vicarious liability "represent[s] a use of the machinery of criminal justice
to impose strict standards of performance on certain business activities which, if improperly
conducted, pose a danger to the public." W. LAFAvE & A. ScoTr, CRIMINAL LAW § 32
(1972).
128 530 F.2d at 1293. One commentator argues, however, that imposing liability on corpo-
rations will not ensure corporate compliance with government regulations. The large corpo-
ration is divided into many departments and the board of directors is insulated from the daily
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In United States v. Little Rock Sewer Committee,129 the Sewer Commit-
tee was held liable for violations of section 1319(c) (2) under a theory of
respondeat superior,13 but the district court did not rely on the broad lan-
guage of Apex. In Little Rock, the Superintendent of the Little Rock
Sewage Treatment Plant knowingly falsified statements in his Monthly
Discharge Monitoring Reports to EPA. Noting that the Sewer Commit-
tee had no knowledge of the falsification, the court nevertheless held
that because the Superintendent was a high level employee, his knowl-
edge could be imputed to the Sewer Committee under the rules of
agency. 131 The court said that the public interest protected by the
FWPCA was so important that the criminal provisions "should be con-
strued and applied with a view toward achieving . . . 'maximum
adherence.' "132
While Apex "could arguably be cited as authority for the broad
proposition that the knowledge of even a low echelon employee may be
imputed to the corporation,"' 33 Little Rock extends liability to the corpo-
ration because the individual falsifying the reports was a high level em-
ployee.' 34 Though imposing vicarious liability on different grounds,
Apex and Little Rock provide support for decisions holding corporations
operations of each department. The board can not ensure that each department complies
with regulations; rather, it concerns itself with whether each department is meeting produc-
tion targets and objectives. The employees, in turn, do not attempt to comply with regula-
tions; "It is these 'immediate' goals and objectives that determine the horizons and interests of
the workers there [of each department]; it is their fulfillment of them that will determine their
progress up the corporate ladder." C. STONE, WHERE THE LAW ENDS 44 (1975).
Moreover, the insulation of the board prevents it from learning that violations have oc-
curred. "[T]here is a natural tendency for 'bad news' of any sort not to rise to the top in an
organization." Id at 45. This problem is exacerbated by the fact that, in large corporations,
it is difficult to locate the source of a violation. Thus, the board can not train employees to
comply with regulations where it is unaware of violations or cannot locate their source.
129 460 F. Supp. 6 (E.D. Ark. 1978).
130 Although respondeat superior is ordinarily applied in civil cases only, it is a form of vicari-
ous liability whereby "the crimes of any employee. . . become the crimes of the corpora-
tion." W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTr, CRIMINAL LAW § 33 (1972).
'3' 460 F. Supp. at 9.
132 Id at 8. In United States v. Hilton, 467 F.2d 1000 (9th Cir. 1972), cer. denied, 409 U.S.
1125 (1973), the court held the defendant corporation criminally liable for violations of the
Sherman Act under a theory of respondeat superior. The Ninth Circuit emphasized that the
Sherman Act protected such an important public interest that the application of vicarious
liability to the employer was essential to "assure adherence by such [defendant's] agents to the
requirements of the Act." Id at 1005.
133 460 F. Supp. at 9.
134 "This Court would have trouble with such a broad proposition [stated in Apex]. De-
fendant Ouelette was a high-level employee. . . and, as such, was in charge of supervising
the operation of the entire plant. Thus, imputation of his knowledge to the Sewer Commit-
tee, his employer, is consistent with normal agency rules and does not require reliance upon
the principle enunciated in Apex." Id at 9.
COMMENTS
criminally liable for the environmental misdeeds of both low and high
level employees.
1. Efectiveness of Criminal Sanctions
A crucial issue is whether the imposition of criminal liability will
induce compliance through increased deterrence. If it does not, the ap-
plication of Apex and Little Rock will not aid the pollution control effort.
The Apex Corporation was placed on probation for three years and
fined $20,000, $15,000 of which was stayed on the condition that the
corporation comply with all pollution regulations during that period.
The Little Rock Sewer Committee was placed on probation for two
years.'3 5 These sanctions induced compliance in the instant cases,
13 6
but an effective criminal enforcement scheme must also deter other cor-
porations from violating the FWPCA.
Imposing criminal sanctions on corporations may not induce suffi-
cient compliance. One theory posits that criminal sanctions are ineffec-
tive because the traditional deterrents to crime cannot be applied to a
corporation. First, society can not imprison a corporation. Second, the
moral stigma of the label of "criminal" is not applicable to polluting
corporations; pollution has been traditionally regarded not as morally
wrong, but rather as a crime merely because it has been declared ille-
gal. 13 7 Moreover, because an entity, not an identifiable individual, is
breaking the law, concepts of moral blame do not attach. 38 Whereas
society views murderers as criminals, it has traditionally viewed a pollut-
ing corporation as merely a profit-maximizing organization which has
decided either that expenditures on costly pollution control devices are
simply not profitable, or that they may force the termination of the
business. '
3 9
While this argument may be compelling for most corporate crime,
it is less convincing when applied to environmental crimes. In light of
the diseases, human misery, and severe damage resulting from the Love
135 See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
136 See supra note 104.
137 Marshall, Environmental Protection and the Role of the Civil Money Penalty: Some Practical and
Legal Considerations, 4 EmrTL. AFF. 323, 329 (1975). [hereinafter cited as Environmental
Protection].
138 Developments in the Law--Corporate Crine. Regulating Corporate Behavior Through Crninal
Sanctions, 92 HARv. L. REv. 1227, 1366 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Corporate Crime]. See also,
Coffee, "No Soul to Damn: No Body to Kick':" An Unscandalized Inquiy into the Problem of Corporate
Punishment, 79 MICH. L. REv. 386, 389-90 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Corporate Punishment]:
".. . the stigmatization of a criminal conviction constitutes an additional and severe penalty
for the white-collar defendant. But this loss of social status is a less significant consideration
for the corporate entity. . . ." (footnote omitted).
139 Environmental Protection, supra note 137, at 330. See also Civil Penalties, supra note 117, at
444.
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Canal incident, for example, society should no longer view these corpo-
rations merely as organizations which made the economic decision not
to take precautionary pollution control measures.1 40 Pollution is a seri-
ous offense, and the stigma of criminality can be applied to organiza-
tions whose behavior endangers public health. Public concern for
environmental quality has not disappeared since the advent of the Rea-
gan Administration.' 4' Moreover, corporations have demonstrated con-
cern regarding their public image with respect to environmental
issues.' 42 Concern for a positive public image and the possibility that
the stigma of criminality may tarnish this image may induce corpora-
tions to comply with pollution regulations.
However, because so few corporations have been convicted of water
pollution violations, and because violations have rarely been as widely
publicized as Love Canal, the fear of public outcry may not as yet be a
sufficient deterrent to corporate violations of pollution regulations.
143
140 In the well publicized Love Canal incident, the Hooker Chemical Company buried
toxic wastes in the Love Canal and had dumped mirex and other carcinogens into the nearby
Niagara River. Because Hooker failed to take adequate precautions, these chemicals seeped
into the groundwater and contaminated local water supplies. Calling the contamination a
"great and imminent peril," in 1978 the New York State Health Commissioner recommended
that pregnant women and young children evacuate their homes near the Love Canal. N.Y.
Times, Aug. 5, 1978, at A18, col. 1. Scientists have already linked the disposal of the danger-
ous wastes to miscarriages and birth defects, and it is expected that additional health
problems will ensue. Id
14 A recent New York Times/CBS poll found that 67% of those polled wanted to main-
tain the present environmental laws even at the cost of impeding economic growth. "The poll
suggests that the policies of the Reagan Administration, which would relax environmental
laws... are out of tune with the sentiments of most Americans." N.Y. Times, Oct. 4, 1981,
§ I, at 30, col. 3.
Moreover, contributions to public interest environmental groups have increased signifi-
cantly since President Reagan's election. By June, 1981, the Sierra Club's membership in-
creased 10% since the 1980 elections. During the previous corresponding period, membership
increased only three percent. The executive director claims, "People are scared to death. We
are getting money hand over fist." The National Resources Defense Council, with 45,000
members, raised $90,000 from contribution requests since the election, doubling that which it
received from two mailings the previous year. [1981] 12 ENV'T REP. (BNA) 203.
142 Mobil Oil, the Chemical Manufacturers of America and other corporations have
launched multimillion dollar advertisement campaigns to demonstrate their ostensible con-
cern for a cleaner environment. The Chemical Manufacturers of America ran the following
advertisement, quoting an engineer of a chemical corporation, in TIME, Dec. 21, 1981, at 1:
[M]y company makes chemicals used by municipalities and industries to purify
drinking water and treat waste-water. And that's satisfying work-helping people solve
their pollution problems.
Second, we're concerned with our own manufacturing methods. Like other chemi-
cal companies, we want to make sure that the water we discharge is safe for our rivers.
Ours is. . . .And the job we're doing is improving the environment for all of us.
143 Another factor reducing the deterrent value of prosecuting corporations is the low rate
of detection of violations. Typically, corporations can conceal pollution violations through
the falsification of reports; it is only where the corporation grossly exceeds its permit condition
that the violation will become apparent. Corporate Pmishmenl, supra note 138, at 390-91.
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2. Imposition of Fizes Against Corporations
The Chicago School1 44 posits that punishing the corporation,
rather than the corporate official, will effectively deter corporate crime.
This approach requires the establishment of fines at a level where it is
more economical for the corporation to implement abatement measures
than to pollute and risk incurring fines. The imposition of fines alleg-
edly deters white-collar crime at the lowest cost to society since society
expends capital to imprison an individual, while it increases its revenue
through the collection of corporate fines.
14 5
One commentator criticizes this approach because it punishes the
innocent while sparing the culpable.1 46 A large fine, which may induce
the corporation to remedy its violations, would have adverse effects on
others; the fine could lead to "reduced corporate solvency, and increased
risk of bankruptcy, possible layoffs and closings of marginal plants, and
injury to stockholders and creditors."' 47  Thus, this commentator
concludes:
The Chicago School position may therefore show mercy to the corporate
executive (who is saved from the possibility of incarceration by the recom-
mendation of a corporate focus), but it imposes a harsh penalty on the less
privileged classes (such as employees, consumers, and others dependent on
the corporation) who bear the indirect burden of corporate penalties.1 48
More importantly, the Chicago School position, despite its concep-
tual validity, presents an unrealistic solution to the real problem of
water pollution. Fines will not be high enough to effectuate the deter-
144 Coffee refers to the "Chicago School" as the approach offered by Richard Posner, Gary
Becker, and other commentators employing an economic analysis of crime and punishment.
Corporate Punishment, supra note 138, at 407.
145 R. POSNER, EcONOMIc ANALYSIS OF THE LAW 236 (2d ed. 1977). See also Posner,
Optimal Sentencesfor White-Collar Crminals, 17 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 409, 410 (1980). Because
volumes have already been written about the Chicago School, this Comment will only briefly
discuss its approach to deterring white-collar crime.
146 Corporate Punishment, supra note 138, at 408.
147 Id
148 Id However, costs are passed on to the "less privileged classes" where a corporation
voluntarily alters its operations to comply with existing regulations. Any enforcement scheme
which causes a firm to incur compliance costs will result in added costs being passed on to
employees, consumers, and other dependents.
Nevertheless, fines and compliance expenditures result in larger costs and thus impose a
greater burden on the "less privileged classes" than would be imposed for voluntary compli-
ance expenditures alone. See Orland, Refections on Corporate Crime.: Law in Search of Theo,7 and
Scholarship, 17 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 501, 516 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Re}?ctions].
Coffee also argues that an enforcement scheme based on fines is inherently unworkable
because it is impossible to establish fines at a level high enough to match the effective threat
of incarceration. Thus, the deterrence level will not be as high as it would be in a scheme in
which the threat of incarceration would deter corporate crime. Coffee, Corporate Crime and
Punishment: A Non-Chicago View of the Economics of Criminal Sanctions, 17 AM. CRIM. L. REV.
419, 436-37 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Crime and Punishment].
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rence level outlined by the Chicago School. Although large fines could
reduce the number of violations, 149 they have rarely been imposed.
Moreover, in light of current federal policies, it is unlikely that Congress
will increase the penalties under the FWPCA and the Refuse Act.
150
Courts imposed minimal fines, if any, on those corporations first
convicted under the FWPCA. 151 Small fines may not deter corporations
from violating the FWPCA because it would cost more to implement
pollution control devices than to pay the fines resulting from criminal
convictions. 1
52
Recently, however, several courts have imposed larger fines on cor-
porations. In Frezzo Bros. 53 the corporation was fined $50,000 and the
owners were fined and jailed. In Hudson Farms,'54 the court fined the
corporation $50,000, and one official $5,000. In Oxford,155 the corpora-
tion pleaded guilty and was fined $100,000, while the president was
fined $100,000 and placed on probation for five years. These convic-
tions and fines may signal a beginning of the imposition of stiffer penal-
ties for violations of pollution laws.' 5 6 Where the possibility of a stiffer
fine may outweigh the potential profits saved from failure to comply
with federal regulations, these larger fines may deter small corporations.
149 Corporate Crime, supra note 138, at 1366.
150 The proposed federal criminal code seeks to substantially increase penalties for viola-
tions ofwater pollution regulations. Willful or negligent violations of discharge permit condi-
tions, 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(1) (1976), would be a class E felony, punishable by fines of $50,000
per day of violation. The maximum fines would be $250,000 for individual violators and $1
million where the defendant is a corporation. The maximum imprisonment would be two
years. S. 1722, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. § 1853 (1980).
Section 1617 also creates a new offense of "Endangerment": placing "another person in
imminent danger of death or bodily injury, and (1) his [the violator's) conduct. . . manifests
an extreme indifference to human life, or (2) his conduct. . . manifests an unjustified disre-
gard for human life." 33 U.S.C. § 1617 (1976). For a discussion of this proposed offense, see
Spurgeon & Fagan, Criminal Liabilitlfor LDfe-Endangering Corporate Conduct, 72 J. GRIM. L. & C.
400 (1981).
It appears unlikely, however, that Congress will pass the code, originally proposed to it in
1973. Although Attorney General William French Smith supports the proposed code, groups
ranging from the Moral Majority to the A.C.L.U. have voiced serious concerns over its con-
tents, and the Senate and House are currently divided over several key aspects of the code.
CALIFORNIA LAWYER, Jan. 1982, at 17.
151 See subra note 135 and accompanying text.
152 Corporate Crime, supra note 138, at 1366-67.
153 602 F.2d 1123 (3d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1074 (1980).
154 12 ENV'T REP. GAS. (BNA) 1445 (E.D. Pa. 1980).
155 487 F. Supp. 852 (E.D. Pa. 1980).
156 The foregoing does not imply that all fines in recent cases have been substantial. In
United States v. Hamel, 551 F.2d 107 (6th Cir. 1977), the defendant was fined the minimum
of $2,500 for discharging approximately 300 gallons of gasoline onto a frozen lake. In United
States v. Syncon Resins, Inc., Crim. No. 81-00138-02 (D.N.J. 1981), summarized in [1981] 12
ENV'T REP. (BNA) 231, the court fined the defendant corporation a total of $7,500 for three
counts of unauthorized discharge of wastes into a nearby river.
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Fines of this magnitude will probably have little effect on large cor-
porations which find it more economical to risk fines than to spend sub-
stantial sums of money to comply with existing regulations. Olin
Corporation provides a good example. t57 Since 1965, Olin has been
convicted three times for filing false statements with the government. In
1965, Olin was convicted and fined $30,000 for filing false statements
regarding kickbacks paid for drug sales. 158 In 1978, Olin was convicted
and fined $40,000 for filing false documents regarding transhipments of
arms. 159 These "modest" fines did not deter Olin from violating the
FWPCA; in 1979, the corporation was fined $70,000, $10,000 for each of
seven counts, for knowing falsification of discharge reports filed with
EPA. 160 Olin's recurring violations illustrate the practical weakness of
an enforcement scheme emphasizing fines; the small penalties imposed
have not, and most likely will not, induce compliance from large
corporations.t61
3. Imprisonment of Corporate Ofials
Theoretically, the imprisonment of corporate officials is the most
effective deterrent to FWPCA violations. The threat of a prison sen-
tence may induce corporate officials of both struggling and profitable
firms to forego substantial profits in order to comply with pollution reg-
ulations. 162 While the moral stigma of a criminal conviction may not
attach to corporations, businessmen, who value their standing in the
community, "are likely to be especially sensitive to the stigma associated
with the criminal conviction."'
163
Some commentators claim, however, that business management is
not deterred by the threat of imprisonment because judges rarely incar-
cerate white-collar criminals. One study outlined reasons for this phe-
nomenon. 164 When sentencing white-collar criminals, judges are
157 See Reflections, supra note 148, at 517-18.
158 Id at 518.
159 Id
160 United States v. Olin Corp., 465 F. Supp. 1120 (W.D.N.Y. 1979).
161 One commentator states: "[]udges are frequently reluctant to impose massive fines on
culpable corporations for fear of injuring innocent stockholders." Refections, supra note 148, at
516 (footnote omitted). See infra notes 164-70 and accompanying text.
162 Corporate Crime, supra note 138, at 1245.
163 H. PACKER, THE LIMrrs OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 356 (1968). Accord, Corporate
Cn'ne, supra note 138, at 1245-46.
Furthermore, where the corporation's actions subject a substantial portion of the com-
munity to health dangers, the community will be even more likely to regard the perpetrator
as a culpable individual.
164 Mann, Wheeler & Sarat, Sentencing the White-Collar Ofender, 17 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 479
(1980), summarized the results of interviews with 51 federal district judges on their perception
of the role and purposes of sentencing white-collar criminals.
[Vol. 73
FEDERAL WATER POLLUTION LAWS
concerned primarily with preventing others in a similar situation from
committing the same act. 165 Despite this avowed concern, judges refrain
from imprisoning white-collar defendants for several reasons. "Most
judges share a widespread belief that the suffering experienced by the
white-collar person as a result of apprehension, public indictment and
conviction, and the collateral disabilities incident to conviction-loss of
job, professional licenses, and status in the community-completely sat-
isfies the need to punish the individual."' 66 In addition, judges may feel
that a businessman will react more adversely to prison conditions than
would other criminals. 167 Judges may also be reluctant to imprison a
white-collar criminal because imprisonment would cause hardship to in-
nocent parties, particularly the defendant's family.
168
Finally, the study cited ease of restitution as a factor reducing the
liklihood of incarceration.169 Because white-collar defendants typically
enjoy a comfortable financial position or have significant earning poten-
tial, the defendant could compensate victims of white-collar crimes. In-
carcerating the defendant, however, would greatly reduce his ability to
compensate the victims. Thus, the study concludes, these factors "bring
the judge to a lesser sanction [fines and probation] than would be called
for by the deterrence rationale [imprisonment] .... ,,170
Environmental crimes, however, present additional considerations
which should make judges less reluctant to imprison polluters. Whereas
most white-collar crimes, such as securities fraud cases, cause financial
damage, illegal discharges can also lead to public health hazards. When
a corporate official authorizes the dumping of chemicals which leads to
increased cancer rates, miscarriages and other health problems, the
"need to punish the individual" has not been satisfied merely by an in-
dictment and conviction.
Moreover, the role of restitution is quite different for environmental
165 Id at 482.
166 id at 483-84.
167 Id at 487. Onejudge said: "[T]he type of existence that jail provides is more hard [sic]
on people who are accustomed to the better existence than it is on people who may not be fed
as well in their homes as they are in jail. . . . T]he judge empathizes more with a white-
collar person whose hardships you can understand, because a lifestyle is more like his or her
own, than someone whose lifestyle you really can't understand." Id
168 Id This discriminatory approach of sentencing white-collar criminals assumes that the
white-collar criminal is more likely to have a family which would suffer from his imprison-
ment than would other criminals.
169 d at 489.
170 Id at 486. Although not explicitly stated, the study implies that these lesser sanctions
reduce the level of general deterrence because potential violators know that it is not likely
that they will be imprisoned for violations.
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crimes than for most white-collar crimes. 171 An individual convicted of
securities fraud may make full restitution to victims by paying them the
amount they were defrauded. An individual who becomes terminally ill
as a result of a chemical company's violations, however, will never be
fully compensated no matter how much money he receives from the
violator.
Finally, because of the possibility of serious illness and the difficulty
of reparation, there is a greater need to prevent pollution violations from
occurring. Since the damage caused by water pollution often cannot be
remedied, judges should imprison corporate officials to ensure deter-
rence of potential violators.
Indeed, several courts have taken steps in this direction. In United
States v. DeRewal,172 the president of a waste disposal company was con-
victed of authorizing the pouring of liquid wastes into a storm sewer
which emptied into the Delaware River near a Philadelphia water
plant. The court sentenced DeRewal to six months in jail, placed him
on probation for four and one-half years, and fined him $20,000.173 In
another case involving extreme health dangers, United States v. DiZtler,174
the president of a disposal company was convicted of authorizing the
dumping of toxic chemicals into the Louisville sewage system. As a re-
sult of the discharge, 161 citizens had to be treated for exposure to the
toxic chemicals.175 Upon conviction, the court sentenced Distler to a two
year term and fined him $50,000. In a case posing less severe health
dangers, United States v. Frezzo Bros. ,176 the owners of a mushroom grow-
ing and manure composting company were convicted for the discharge
of manure-rich water into a nearby stream. The court sentenced the
defendant owners to thirty days imprisonment. 177
Cognizant of the dangers of water pollution, these judges were ap-
parently convinced that the violators had not been sufficiently punished
by an indictment and conviction alone. Judge Allen, in his sentencing
of Distler, said, "No defendant to come before the court has exhibited a
more callous and flagrant disregard for the safety and lives of vast num-
bers of citizens of this area than the defendant."' 178 The judges recog-
171 One of the judges interviewed cited a securities fraud case as an example of the ease of
restitution in the white-collar context. Id at 491.
172 Crim. No. 77-287 (E.D. Pa. 1978), summarized in [1979] 9 ENV'T REP. (BNA) 405.
173 Id
174 Crim. No. 77-00108-01 L (W.D. Ky. 1979), summarized in [1979] 9 ENV'T REP. (BNA)
1649, af'd, No. 79-5339 (6th Cir. Feb. 12, 1981).
175 Transcript of Sentencing at 9 (W.D. Ky. 1979).
176 602 F.2d 1123 (3d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1074 (1980).
177 For further discussion of Frezzo Bros., see Crimial Prosecution, supra note 40, at 983.
178 Transcript of Sentencing at 9 (W.D. Ky. 1979), reported in Federal Enforcement, supra
note 33, at 607.
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nized that more severe sanctions were necessary to deter the criminal
behavior.
C. AN EFFICIENT CRIMINAL ENFORCEMENT APPROACH
The water pollution enforcement scheme must maximize the utility
of water pollution laws, particularly since EPA now has fewer resources
to expend on the costly and time consuming process of prosecuting vio-
lators. 7 9 EPA has begun to formulate an efficient enforcement program.
One enforcement memorandum outlines the factors to be considered
when deciding whether to commence criminal proceedings. 80 Two im-
portant factors are harm to public health and harm to the environ-
ment. 81 The memorandum stresses that where environmental harm is
minimal, criminal proceedings should not be commenced although
there has been a violation.18 2 However, where the violations subject the
public to serious health dangers, then criminal proceedings are war-
ranted. The prosecution of Distler and DeRewal appears consistent
with this efficient approach.
183
Significant economic damage is another factor supporting the initi-
ation of criminal proceedings.'8 4 In Distler, the government spent over
$1,500,000 cleaning up the discharged chemicals and the polluted sew-
age system. 85 This type of costly violation could be deterred if potential
violators were made aware of the possibility of imprisonment for such
violations.
The memorandum also emphasizes the deterrent effect of criminal
proceedings: "[L]ong histories of non-compliance or unwillingness to
comply with administrative action should be considered for criminal
179 "The cost of trial in pollution cases is often burdensome on the government. In the
Ditler case the trial began on November 9, 1978 and lasted through December 26, 1978.
There were over six thousand pages of transcript with five volumes of pretrial proceedings
(footnote omitted). Federal Enforcement, srupra note 33, at 609. Although unable to give a
precise figure, one EPA staff member said that the cost of investigating and prosecuting viola-
tors can range from "a couple thousand dollars to hundreds of thousands of dollars." Inter-
view with EPA Attorney (Jan. 31, 1982). Some violations require only minimal investigation
and short trials. "Midnight dumping" violations, however, might require considerable inves-
tigation and technical analysis to identify the violator, and a lengthy trial might follow. The
major costs in criminal prosecutions are expenditures for attorney time, sampling and analysis
costs, paper and administrative costs, and costs in hiring experts. Id
180 Enforcement Strateg, sufira note 40.
181 Id at 3, 4.
182 Id at 4, 5.
183 Although some might question the "efficiency" of ignoring minor criminal violations,
such an approach is essential where the number of actions brought is limited. Ideally, EPA
should prosecute all violators, but such an approach is impossible within budgetary
constraints.
184 Enforcement StrateV, sufira note 40, at 3.
185 Transcript of Sentencing, at 9 (W.D. Ky. 1979).
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prosecution to deter other members of the regulated community from
adopting similar courses of action . .. "186 It is imperative that the
"regulated community" realize that significant violations of FWPCA
will be prosecuted and that civil sanctions are not EPA's exclusive
remedy.
Thus, the memorandum realistically assesses the limits to EPA's en-
forcement effort. Because all violators cannot be prosecuted, EPA must
prosecute in those cases in which it can minimize the water deterioration
likely to ensue from the relaxed water pollution control program.
V. THE USE OF STIFFER CRIMINAL PENALTIES: EXPANDING
CRIMINAL ENFORCEMENT POSSIBILITIES
Although criminal enforcement of water pollution regulations has
been based almost exclusively on the FWPCA and the Refuse Act, EPA
is now starting to rely on other laws which impose stiffer penalties. The
imposition of severe sanctions could induce compliance through in-
creased deterrence, even if the number of prosecutions decreases.
EPA can apply several felony provisions to monitor the discharge of
pollutants. 18 U.S.C. § 1001 provides:
Whoever . . . knowingly and willfully falsifies . . . a material fact, or
makes any false, fictitious or fraudulent, statements or representations, or
makes or uses any false writing or document knowing the same to contain
any false, fictitious or fraudulent statement or entry, shall be fined not
more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.'
8 7
Section 1001, a general prohibition against fraud, can be applied to
prosecute knowing and willful falsification of discharge reports. Al-
though 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(2) of the FWPCA also prohibits knowing
falsification of discharge reports, prosecutions pursuant to section 1001
have the advantage of a stiffer penalty-a maximum fine of $10,000
and/or five years imprisonment-than that provided for under section
1319(c) (2).188
EPA can also prosecute under 18 U.S.C. § 371, a conspiracy
provision:
If two or more persons conspire either to commit any offense against the
United States, or to defraud the United States. . . and any one or more of
such persons do any act to effect the object of the conspiracy, each shall be
fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or
both .... 189
186 Enforcement Strategy, supra note 40, at 6. The memorandum also states that the "Motive
and Intent" of the violator is a factor in deciding whether to criminally charge the offender.
187 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1976).
188 See mpra note 37 and accompanying text.
189 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1976).
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Section 371 can be used to deter pollution violations; when a discharger
has violated its discharge permit conditions, EPA may claim that the
violation was part of a conspiracy to defraud EPA of its lawful regula-
tory function.
EPA has begun to prosecute dischargers under these stiffer laws for
alleged violations of various permit regulations. In United States v. Olin
Corp. ,190 the corporation and three corporate officers were charged with
making false statements regarding the reporting of discharges. The cor-
poration was authorized under its permit to discharge small quantities
of mercury into the Niagara River. The reports submitted to EPA
stated that the corporation was discharging only permitted amounts of
mercury, when it was actually discharging more than the permit al-
lowed. The corporation and the officials were charged with violations of
18 U.S.C. § 1001, 18 U.S.C. § 357 and 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(2). Al-
though the defendants were found guilty under 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(2),
they were acquitted of the felony charges. 191
In In re GrandJury Proceedings: FMC Corp. ,192 the corporation, its
legal counsel, and an environmental manager were charged with viola-
tions of 18 U.S.C. § 371, 18 U.S.C. § 1001 and 18 U.S.C. § 1505 (ob-
struction of agency proceedings), 193 for misrepresentation and
withholding information about tetrachloride discharges into a nearby
river. The corporation pleaded guilty to the charges while the prosecu-
tion dropped charges against the two employees. 194 The corporation
was fined $35,000 and ordered to create an escrow account of $1 million,
which was to be used to study water pollution and its effects on human
health. 19
Dropping charges against employees is contrary to the goal of de-
terring violators, but the $1 million escrow account may have'been a
sufficient penalty in this case. Because the maximum fine under the
felony provisions is no larger than that allowed under section 1319 of the
FWPCA, felony charges are employed primarily for the possibility of
imposing longer prison sentences. This benefit, however, cannot be real-
ized with corporations, which can be fined but not imprisoned. 196
EPA can also initiate criminal proceedings for violations of 18
190 465 F. Supp. 1120 (W.D.N.Y. 1979).
191 Id
192 Crim. No. 79-1481 (E.D. Pa. filed Feb. 26, 1980), summarized in [1980] 11 ENV'T REP.
(BNA) 1021.
193 18 U.S.C. § 1505 (1976).
194 Crim. No. 19-1481.
195 As an alternative or supplement to fines, EPA may settle a case by having the violator
create an escrow account. This practical approach ensures that money is paid not to the
United States Treasury, but rather is used to study water pollution.
196 As the FMC case demonstrates, however, EPA may employ the felony provisions
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U.S.C. § 401(3), a criminal contempt provision. 197 In United States v.
Coming Fibers, 98 the corporation and its vice-president pleaded guilty to
charges of unauthorized discharges (33 U.S.C. § 1319(c) (1)), knowing
falsification of reports (33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(2), 18 U.S.C. §§ 1001, 1002)
and the willful violation of a civil consent decree (18 U.S.C. § 401(3)).
The defendant corporation had signed a consent decree four years ear-
lier requiring modifications in the operation of its paper mill. The cor-
poration, however, continued operating the mill without installing the
required equipment, thereby violating the consent decree, which led to
the contempt charges.' 99
Thus, the felony provisions may provide severe sanctions for viola-
tions previously deemdd misdemeanors under the FWPCA. It is un-
clear, however, whether this approach will deter discharges. Of critical
concern are the issues of whether the courts will apply the felony provi-
sions and whether they will impose substantial penalties. If courts do
impose stiffer sentences, EPA would be able to deter potential violators
through the threat of severe sanctions.
VI. CONCLUSION
Budget cutbacks, deregulation, and an unconcerned EPA Adminis-
trator have substantially undermined the federal water pollution control
effort. The dismantling of pollution abatement programs comes at a
time when society is producing and discharging more toxic chemicals
than ever before. Unless EPA maximizes its diminished resources in an
effective enforcement scheme, the Reagan Administration's rejection of
a strong environmental effort will likely lead to significant degradation
of the nation's waterways.
MARK W. SCHNEIDER
against corporations as an inducement for violators to settle cases by the creation of large
escrow accounts.
197 18 U.S.C. § 401(3) (1976), provides that a court may "Punish by fine or imprisonment,
at its discretion" for contempt.
198 Crim. No. 81-00055-I (D. Vt. July 29, 1981).
199 The court has not yet sentenced the defendants.
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